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ABSTRACT
Cyber aacks have become serious threats to Industrial Control
systems as well. It becomes important to develop a serious threat de-
fense system against such vulnerabilities. For such process control
systems, safety should also be assured apart from security. As un-
earthing vulnerabilities and patching them is not a feasible solution,
these critical infrastructures need safeguards to prevent accidents,
both natural and articial, that could potentially be hazardous.
Morita proposed an eective Zone division[3], capable of evalu-
ating remote and concealed aacks on the system, coupled with
Principal Component Analysis. But the need to analyze the node
that has been compromised and stopping any further damages,
requires an automated technique.
Illustrating the basic ideas we’ll simulate a simple Water plant. We
propose a new automated approach based on Long Short Term
Memory networks capable of detecting aacks and pin point the
location of the breach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the age of Internet, cyber aacks have become a major threat.
Until recently only private and information centered systems were
breached. But now, cyber aacks are a threat to Industrial Sys-
tems as Well. Serious security vulnerabilities are patched in regular
personal computers and commercial spaces, quite frequently but
Industrial control systems are seldom xed as these patches could
lead to new conicts in the system.
is opens up a wide space for aackers to sneak in. A prime exam-
ple would be of Stuxnet, that sabotaged Iranian uranium enrichment
facilities in 2010.
1.1 e Stuxnet malware
Stuxnet utilized existing vulnerabilities in the operating system,
along with a good understanding of the PLCs to formulate a mal-
ware. e sole target of the malware was to manipulate the working
of centrifuges that enriched Uranium. Such carefully craed aacks
cannot be prevented unless a perfect system is built. Instead, it is
enough to detect such breaches and then assess the damage. us
it is important to build a reliable security and safety mechanism to
prevent against aacks like Stuxnet.
1.2 Zone Based PCA
Hashimoto proposed a method of securing the information system
by dividing the network into ”plural zones”. By Zone Division
[1] the probability of detecting possible aacks and accidents is
increased.
Conjoined with PCA [3], Zone Based PCA can analyze the re-
lationship between the variables in plural zones and detect any
changes caused by potential concealed breaches and unintended
accidents. ere can many types of relationships between the vari-
ables that are analyzed dierently by Zone-Based PCA. An on-board
safety personnel is still required, who may notice the change in
PCA variables and report an anomaly.
1.3 Sequence Learning
We propose a new approach based on sequence learning algorithms,
to detect changes from regular working unlike relationships be-
tween variables. e neural network architecture, utilized is capable
of learning how the normal functioning of the system looks like
and detect if something has changed.
In order to illustrate the working of the system, we simulate a
simple water plant, that circulates hot water between two tanks.
2 SIMULATED SYSTEM
e simulation is a very basic version of the plant. In this sys-
tem(Figure 1), water circulates between two tanks (Tank1 and
Tank2) . e systems contain SCADA and other operators. e
plant consists of many sensors and controls (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Simulated Water Plant
2.1 Variables in the System
L1 and L2 are levels of water in Tank1 and Tank2 respectively.
Similarly, T1 and T2 measure the temperatures. e Heater (H)
provides heat to increase the temperature of water in Tank2. e
Pump (P) pumps the heated water into Tank1. Valves V1 and V2 are
controlled to allow water to ow across them. Tank1 is assumed to
radiate heat and cool down the water.
We dene two kinds of variables in our system. Process variables
are the ones that are measured by sensors. Control Variables can
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be manipulated and change the state of the plant.
Process Variables: L1, L2, T1, T2, F1, F2, F3
Control Variables: V1, V2, H, P
2.2 Network Conguration of the System
e network is divided into two control zones, such that the control
of a control variable that directly aects a process variable is in a
dierent zone.
Zone 1: L1, T1, V2, F2, H
Zone 2: L2, T2, V1, F1, F3, P
A control variable in a zone cannot directly aect process vari-
ables in the same zone. In the current setup, L1 depends directly on
the ow F1 controlled by V1. erefore they are being separated.
e rest of the division can be explained by similar logic fashion.
H decides the amount of heat delivered into the system. ere
by it controls both T1 and T2, yet it is clubbed with T1 in Zone1 as
there is more direct dependency between H and T2 as compared
to H and T1. A formal method based on decidability matrices was
presented by Hashimoto [1]
Figure 2: Information Flow Network of the Water Plant
OPC: OLE for Process Control,
CADS: Cyber Attack Detection System
3 ZONE BASED PCA
Principal Component analysis re-projects the data in the study into
new space, with coordinates of high variance. us the variables
with high variance can be maximally noted across them. PCA in
a simple sense brings down the high dimensionality of the data
to a smaller number. In our experiments, we’ve considered top 3
coordinates, in decreasing order of variance. Figure 3 shows this
behavior of normal functioning.
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PCA Based Detect ion (Top 3 Scores).
Figure 3: PCA projection of an un-compromised plant.
e order of variance is as follows; blue, green, red in decreasing
order. e periodic nature of the plot is due to the way water is
circulated. Now we’ll simulate a data injection aack with conceal-
ment.
e aack manipulates Zone 2 and takes over the control of
variables V1 and P. By seing them both to 0, the water in Tank1
doesn’t decrease and the temperature of Tank1 increase to the
extent where it depressurizes.
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Figure 4: PCA projection of compromised plant.
Zone 2 variables are remotely manipulated.
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Figure 4 shows the dynamics of this process. e aack begins
at simulation point 500.
ere is drastic change in the behavior of the projection in blue.
Any on-board personnel can realize such a change of high magni-
tude and shut down the systems if necessary.
It becomes dicult with increasing types of manipulation to
identify what kind of change in the systems produces a particular
kind of behavior in the PCA projection.
4 ZONE BASED LSTM NETWORK
e PCA method evaluates relationships between variables and
raises alarm when the relationships or the dependencies between
the variables changes. e relationships can change in many dier-
ent ways when the number of variables involved is very large.
Instead of understanding the dependency between them, we
focus on dierentiating themodes of running of the plant as a whole.
A normal working state is very dierent from a compromised state.
As the systems tend to repetitive work, it is not hard to notice that
there is a paern to the way an un-compromised plant produces
data.
In order to achieve this, we use sequence learning LSTM net-
works in our method.
4.1 Long Short Term Memory
Figure 5: Long Short Term Memory, LSTM, Units in action.
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LSTM[2] is a form of Recurrent Neural Network, it remembers
what’s important and forgets the trivial things. It is capable of
learning paerns in data and identify those that don’t match.
LSTM achieves this by what are termed as memory control gates
in the unit. ere are dierent gates to control and lter data. e
gates decide what kind of variables at a simulation point are impor-
tant. By doing so repeatedly, it learns the values of the variables to
look for to understand the sequence paern. It then assigns a score
, that signies how strongly it believes in the paern.
We train an LSTM network with a logged data of the normal
functioning of plant, and use it to give a condence score to the
previous 50 points at every evaluation point. is enables us to
know if the current sequence of data generated is in high correlation
with data generated during normal functioning.
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Figure 6: LSTM score of an un-compromised plant.
Normal functioning ensures a score match near close to 1, which
is expected.
In Figure 7 we compromise zone2 in a similar fashion. Both P
and V1 are set to 0 here.
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Figure 7: LSTM score of compromised plant.
Zone 2 variables are remotely manipulated and P is set to 0.
It is to be noted that when the zone is compromised, the running
of the plant produces a dierent paern of data. en the LSTM
network gives us a correlation score with the actual paern of
functioning, which in this case, when P is set to 0 averages around
a value of 0.85.
When the variable P is set to 1 (Figure 8), the paern of execution
produces scores averaging around 0.8.
By thresholding at dierent values we can easily identify which
variable the aacker has modied. We can also detect the zone
which has been compromised.
3
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Evaluat ion Point
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
S
co
re
Neural Network Based Predict ion.
Figure 8: LSTM score of compromised plant.
Zone 2 variables are remotely manipulated and P is set to 1.
A plausible set of thresholds to detect the variable could be.
P = 0: score ∈ (0.8, 0.9)
P = 1: score ∈ (0.75, 0.85)
5 CONCLUSION
Aack Detection is of paramount importance as opposed to un-
earthing vulnerabilities and xing them, in Industrial Systems due
to high latency in patching their systems. e proposed method
for intrusion detection, based on LSTM is also capable of diagnos-
ing the aack for points of failure. Sequence-based learning and
anomaly detection have an advantage over PCA-based methods in
this regard. is approach shows an example of interdisciplinary
work on implementing machine learning technologies for tackling
the problems of Industrial Systems and Networks.
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